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HAS ADDY V. JENKINS, INC. HEIGHTENED THE 
STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHING A REASONABLE 
INFERENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE IN MAINE?  
Denitsa N. Pocheva-Smith∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose the following: A subcontractor is hired by a construction company to 
dry-wall the outside of a building.  The general contractor provides and erects a 
three-story staging to assist the subcontractor during that process.  The staging is 
installed before the subcontractor is scheduled to start work, but does not contain 
safety equipment, such as rails, platforms, or ladders, and is not tied to the building.     
The subcontractor begins work on the building on Monday.  On that same day, 
he falls while ascending the staging.  He reports the fall to the general contractor 
and asks that safety equipment be installed on that portion of the building.   
Later that week, on Friday, the subcontractor spends about five hours on the 
high level of the staging.  He then climbs up to the roof and performs work on the 
chimney for another hour.  Shortly thereafter, the subcontractor finds himself on 
the ground.  He remembers that he was on the roof of the main building and fell 
while climbing down the staging.  However, he does not remember how he stepped 
off the roof or exactly how he fell.  There were no witnesses to the accident.  
These are the facts of Addy v. Jenkins, Inc.,1 as stated by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, in a review of the trial court’s decision to 
grant defendant Jenkins, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment.2  It must be noted 
that, in his deposition, the plaintiff testified that he could not remember whether he 
fell from the roof of an adjacent mechanical building, from a ladder leading to that 
building, or from the staging.3  However, the plaintiff later submitted an errata 
sheet, in which he noted that he recalled he had been on the roof of the main 
building and that he had fallen to the ground while climbing down the staging.4  
Despite that inconsistency, the Law Court pointed out that on an appeal from 
summary judgment the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the plaintiff in this case.5 
The Law Court held in Addy that summary judgment for the defendant on the 
issue of proximate causation was appropriate because “[a]ny finding that [the 
plaintiff’s] fall was caused by a defect in the staging would be based on speculation 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law; Master of Law, 2006, Sofia 
University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria.  I would like to thank Professor Melvyn Zarr and Attorney 
Peter Clifford for their invaluable comments, ideas, and feedback throughout the drafting and editing 
process.  I am also grateful to my husband, family, and friends for their continued support.  
 1. 2009 ME 46, 969 A.2d 935.  
 2. Id. ¶¶ 2-5, 969 A.2d at 937-38.     
 3. Id. ¶ 5, 969 A.2d at 937. 
 4. Id.  An errata sheet is “[a]n attachment to a deposition transcript containing the deponent’s 
corrections upon reading the transcript and the reasons for those corrections.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 582 (8th ed. 2004). 
 5. Addy, 2009 ME 46, ¶ 2, 969 A.2d at 937. 
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or conjecture.”6  Justice Silver, joined by Justice Levy, disagreed and expressed his 
concern that the majority’s decision created “a new and heightened burden with 
respect to the causation element of tort law, and . . . put plaintiffs at a disadvantage 
for a lack of memory that may itself be an inextricable part of the accident and the 
injury.”7 
The Law Court also discussed the defendant’s duty of care to the plaintiff and 
the breach of that duty; however, these topics are beyond the scope of this Note and 
will not be examined further.8  The Law Court determined that the plaintiff had 
“established on a prima facie basis that [the defendant] owed a duty to him to 
provide a safe workplace environment,” and that the plaintiff had presented 
sufficient evidence in order to overcome summary judgment on the issue of the 
defendant’s breach.9  Justice Silver, joined by Justice Levy, concurred with that 
portion of the majority’s opinion.10 
Part II of this Note examines the concept of proximate cause generally under 
Maine law and the standard of review on motions for summary judgment and for 
judgment as a matter of law in Maine cases.  Additionally, Part II reviews Maine’s 
precedent on the issue of reasonable inference of proximate cause.  This review 
focuses particularly on cases in which the plaintiff had no recollection of or could 
not explain how he was injured and there were no eye witnesses to relate what had 
transpired.  Part III of this Note analyzes the procedural history of Addy and the 
reasoning applied by the majority and the dissent.  Finally, in Part IV, this Note 
provides an in-depth analysis of the Addy decision and its effect on the doctrine of 
reasonable inference of proximate cause in Maine.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Elements of Negligence and the Nature of  
Causation in American Jurisprudence  
In order to prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence the following four elements: (1) that the defendant 
owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that 
the defendant’s breach was the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of some type of 
harm suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered an injury.11  
Accordingly, with respect to the third element, a finding of causation requires the 
application of a two-prong test.12  This Note’s focus is on the second part of that 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15, 969 A.2d at 940.   
 7. Id. ¶ 18, 969 A.2d at 940 (Silver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 8. Additionally, the plaintiff’s wife had filed a claim for loss of consortium but that claim was not 
an issue on appeal.  Id. ¶ 1 n.1, 969 A.2d at 937 (citation to footnote only). 
 9. Id. ¶ 9, 969 A.2d at 938.  
 10. Id. ¶ 17, 969 A.2d at 940 (Silver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 11. Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law Practice: Demystifying 
Some Legal Causation “Riddles,” 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 3 (2007).  See also W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984).   
 12. Peter C. Haley, Paradigms of Proximate Cause, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 147, 148 (2000).  First, the 
fact-finder must determine whether the plaintiff’s damages would not have been incurred but for the 
defendant’s breach of the duty owed.  David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 
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test—establishing proximate cause.13 
For the past four hundred years, courts and commentators have struggled to 
properly understand and apply the concept of proximate cause in negligence 
actions.14  One of the reasons for these difficulties is the fact that proximate cause 
has very little to do with causation per se.15  For example, one commentator has 
stated:   
“Proximate cause”—in itself an unfortunate term—is merely the limitation which 
the courts have placed upon the actor’s responsibility for the consequences of the 
actor’s conduct . . . . As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to 
those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such 
significance that the law is justified in imposing liability.  Some boundary must be 
set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea 
                                                                                                     
TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (1997).  The “but for” test is the traditional rule for factual causation; other 
standards, such as independently sufficient causes, the “loss of chance” rule, and the rules of multiple 
fault and alternative liability, market-share liability, enterprise liability, liability based on concerted 
action, and incitement provide further assistance to the fact-finder in analyzing factual causation.  See 
VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 355-409 (4th ed. 2009).  
However, detailed review of these theories is beyond the scope of this Note. 
  If the plaintiff has proven factual cause, the fact-finder then goes on to determine whether “the 
plaintiff’s loss or injury was foreseeable by the defendant, and . . . as a fundamental policy of the law, 
the defendant’s responsibility should extend to paying for the loss/injury at issue, even if the loss/injury 
was indeed foreseeable.”  Haley, supra, at 148.    
 13. Commentators often equate proximate causation with foreseeability, which has been considered 
an important factor in the proximate cause analysis.  JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 12, at 417.  The law 
does not require that the exact occurrence of an accident be foreseen; rather, it is sufficient that the 
broad outlines of the injury be foreseeable, Merhi v. Becker, 325 A.2d 270, 273 (Conn. 1973), and that 
the plaintiff generally falls within the class of persons to which the defendant owes a duty.  See 
generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).     
  Other theories have also shaped the concept of proximate cause and have played a role in 
determining its exact contours.  Under the theory of direct causation, liability attaches whenever there is 
an unbroken chain of events between the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff’s injury, no 
matter how unexpected or bizarre.  JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 12, at 413; see generally In re 
Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., (1921) 3 K.B. 560 (Eng.) (where a ship 
hand negligently knocked a plank into the hold of a ship carrying cases of benzine and petrol, and the 
plank unexpectedly struck a spark that ignited the petroleum vapor that had collected in the hold, started 
a fire and burned the ship down; liability was imposed for the loss of the ship, even though the damage 
could not reasonably have been expected, because the loss was a direct result of the negligence).  The 
direct causation theory has influenced American jurisprudence.  JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 12, at 
414. 
  The theory of result within the risk provides that the defendant should be held liable only if the 
actual injury resulted from one of the risks that made the defendant’s conduct negligent.  Id. at 430; see 
generally Di Ponzio v. Riordan, 679 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1997) (a gas station patron, who was injured 
when a vehicle that had been left unattended and with the engine running at a gas pump by another 
driver rolled forward and pinned the patron between two vehicles, could not recover against the gas 
station because the risk that the unattended vehicle would cause injury was not among the hazards 
associated with leaving a vehicle running).   
  The related theories of intervening and superseding causes provide further insight.  Intervening 
causes are those events which come into play after the negligent act of the defendant and which 
participate along with the defendant’s conduct in causing the harm.  JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 12, 
at 439.  Superseding causes are those intervening causes that break the chain of proximate cause 
between the defendant’s negligence and the harm and absolve the defendant of legal responsibility.  Id. 
 14. Swisher, supra note 11, at 8.  
 15. Id.  
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of justice or policy.16 
In other words, proximate cause is a policy determination of the legislature or the 
courts to limit tort liability in certain circumstances.17     
In the context of causation, it is the court’s function to determine whether the 
evidence causes reasonable minds to differ as to whether the conduct of the 
defendant has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the plaintiff, and 
whether the harm could be apportioned among two or more causes.18  In addition, 
the court decides the questions of causation and apportionment in any case in 
which reasonable minds could not differ about the facts.19  However, when the 
evidence could cause reasonable minds to differ, it is within the jury’s realm to 
determine whether the defendant’s negligence has been a substantial factor in 
causing harm to the plaintiff, and the apportionment of the harm to more than one 
cause.20  
B.  Negligence and the Issue of Proximate Cause in Maine  
In Maine, the negligence cause of action has been defined almost exclusively 
by the Law Court—legislative involvement has been limited to certain areas, such 
as medical malpractice and products liability, and the Restatement of Torts has 
seldom been cited as authority.21  If a plaintiff is to prevail in a negligence claim in 
Maine, he “must establish that the [defendant was] under a duty to conform to a 
certain standard of conduct and that a breach of that duty proximately caused an 
injury to the plaintiff.”22  Accordingly, in addressing the issue of causation, the 
Law Court has dispensed with factual cause, and its focus has been exclusively on 
proximate cause.23 
The Law Court has noted that “[v]ery few words commonly employed in the 
law of torts have occasioned as much case law and confusion as the term 
‘proximate cause.’”24  The Law Court has defined it as “that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, 
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”25  
Under Maine law, a negligent act would be the legal or proximate cause of an 
injury “if (a) the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, 
and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the 
                                                                                                     
 16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 264. 
 17. Swisher, supra note 11, at 8.  
 18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434(1) (1965). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. § 434(2). 
 21. JACK SIMMONS ET AL., MAINE TORT LAW § 7.02 (2004 ed.). 
 22. Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me. 1986).  
 23. See Allen v. Hunter, 505 A.2d 486, 488 (Me. 1986) (the trial court’s application of the “but for” 
test “improperly blurred the distinction between the discrete principles of proximate cause and 
negligence”). 
 24. Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 495 (Me. 1973). 
 25. Michalka v. Great N. Paper Co., 151 Me. 98, 105, 116 A.2d 139, 143 (1955).  
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manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.”26   
In Maine, as in other jurisdictions, whether an injury was proximately caused 
by an actor’s negligent conduct is a question of fact that is to be resolved by the 
fact-finder, unless reasonable minds cannot differ as to how an injury occurred and 
the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.27  Accordingly, 
proximate cause issues are often reviewed by Maine courts in connection with 
motions for summary judgment and claims of insufficiency of the evidence to 
support a verdict.  
C.  Maine’s Standard of Review on Motions for Summary Judgment and for 
Judgment as a Matter of Law  
To review a motion for summary judgment in Maine, the court is summoned to 
“examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the [party opposing the 
motion] to determine whether the record supports the conclusion that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law.”28  A fact in question is material if it has the potential of 
affecting the outcome of the case.29  An issue is genuine when the facts set forth in 
the record would require a jury to choose between the parties’ differing versions of 
the truth.30  On appeal, the Law Court reviews de novo the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment.31 
Under Maine law, in order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the 
non-moving party must present evidence that would be sufficient to overcome a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law.32  The party opposing the motion “must 
establish a prima facie case for each element of his cause of action.”33  
Consequently, the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law “when any 
jury verdict for the [non-moving party] would be based on conjecture or 
speculation.”34  
Additionally, in reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law based on a 
claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict, the court’s task is to 
determine whether “any reasonable view of the evidence and those inferences that 
are justifiably drawn from that evidence supports the jury verdict.”35  If “any 
reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a verdict for the opposing party 
                                                                                                     
 26. Wing, 300 A.2d at 495-96.  According to the Law Court, the foundational basis for proximate 
cause is the “reasonable foreseeability of injury.”  Brewer v. Roosevelt Motor Lodge, 295 A.2d 647, 652 
(Me. 1972). 
 27. See Klingerman v. SOL Corp. of Me., 505 A.2d 474, 478 (Me. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 434(1) (1965). 
 28. Champagne v. Mid-Me. Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶ 5, 711 A.2d 842, 844.   
 29. Donald G. Alexander, Tips for Success in Summary Judgment Practice, 16 ME. B.J. 172, 174 
(2001); Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. 
 30. Prescott v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 250, ¶ 5, 721 A.2d 169, 171-72. 
 31. Efstathiou v. Aspinquid, Inc., 2008 ME 145, ¶ 13, 956 A.2d 110, 116.  
 32. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 1997 ME 99, ¶ 8, 694 A.2d 924, 926. 
 33. Fleming v. Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1995).  A prima facie showing requires merely 
that a party satisfy its burden of production on each element of the cause of action.  See Oak Ridge 
Builders, Inc. v. Howland, No. CV-03-17, 2006 WL 2959690, at *10 (Me. Super. Oct. 6, 2006). 
 34. Fleming, 658 A.2d at 1076. 
 35. Bates v. Anderson, 614 A.2d 551, 552 (Me. 1992).  
2010] A REASONABLE INFERENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 355 
pursuant to the substantive law that is an essential element of the claim,” granting 
the motion would be improper.36  A particular application of these rules is found 
within the context of the doctrine of reasonable inference of proximate cause.    
D.  Reasonable Inference of Proximate Cause under Maine Law 
In certain circumstances, a plaintiff may not be able to remember, recount, or 
explain how an accident happened and how he was injured.37  In these situations, 
the plaintiff may still prevail on a motion for summary judgment or for judgment as 
a matter of law if he can overcome that deficiency by producing other reliable 
evidence.38  Such evidence may be in the form of eye witness testimony, known 
physical facts, or reasonable inferences of proximate cause, and may be direct or 
circumstantial.39  When making conclusions based on known facts, fact-finders 
may and should use their common sense and need not ignore their own outside-of-
court life experiences.40  Reasonable inferences may be considered if they are 
rational and flow logically from the evidence.41  The fact-finder may even consider 
multiple reasonable inferences, so long as they are not equally probable.42  In these 
cases, however, the mere possibility of causation is not sufficient, and the 
defendant would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if a finding of 
proximate cause would be based on pure speculation or conjecture, or “even if the 
probabilities [were] evenly balanced.”43  
It is apparent from the brief review of these rules that a finding of the existence 
or lack of a reasonable inference of proximate cause requires a case-by-case 
determination.  Therefore, it would be both helpful and instructive to a proper 
examination of Addy to explore the Law Court’s past decisions on this issue. 
E.  Maine’s Precedent: Reasonable Inference of Proximate Cause Found 
The Law Court applied the analysis of reasonable inference of proximate cause 
as early as 1908.  In Lebrecque v. Hill Manufacturing Co.,44 the Law Court was 
called upon to review a motion to set aside the verdict in favor of the plaintiff as 
being against the evidence.45  The plaintiff was an employee at the defendant’s 
cotton mill, and his responsibilities included operating an “opener” machine.46  The 
plaintiff suffered multiple fractures of his right arm when an allegedly defective 
leather belt connecting two of the pulleys of the “opener” broke and drew his arm 
into the pulley while he was operating the machine according to the instructions 
                                                                                                     
 36. Currier v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 680 A.2d 453, 455 (Me. 1996).  
 37. Thompson v. Frankus (Thompson II), 151 Me. 54, 58, 115 A.2d 718, 720 (1955). 
 38. See id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. See Melanson v. Reed Bros., 146 Me. 16, 22, 76 A.2d 853, 856 (1950).  
 41. Addy, 2009 ME 46, ¶ 20, 969 A.2d at 940 (Silver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Hersum v. Kennebec Water Dist., 151 Me. 256, 263, 117 A.2d 334, 338 (Me. 1955). 
 42. Addy, 2009 ME 46, ¶ 20, 969 A.2d at 940.  
 43. Houde v. Millett, 2001 ME 183, ¶ 11, 787 A.2d 757, 759 (quoting Merriam v. Wagner, 2000 
ME 159, ¶ 10, 757 A.2d 778, 781). 
 44. 104 Me. 380, 71 A. 1023 (1908). 
 45. Id. at 381, 71 A. at 1023. 
 46. Id. 
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given to him by his supervisor.47  The accident happened extremely quickly and the 
plaintiff could not describe exactly how his arm was drawn into the pulley.48  In 
addition, no one witnessed the events.49   
Nonetheless, the Law Court stated that to overturn the jury verdict would mean 
to hold that the inference drawn by the jury would be indisputably wrong and the 
contrary inference would be the only reasonable one, and determined that “in some 
way the breaking of the belt was the proximate cause of [the plaintiff’s] injuries.50  
Additionally, the court highlighted that the plaintiff’s version of the events was not 
contradicted by any direct evidence or discredited by any circumstances or 
improbabilities.51     
In 1955, in Thompson v. Frankus (Thompson II),52 the Law Court was asked to 
review the grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law for the defendant at 
the close of the evidence.53  In that case, on the night of the accident, the plaintiff 
was visiting a friend who was a tenant in a second-floor apartment in a building 
owned by the defendant.54  The only means of ingress and regress from that 
apartment was a common stairway that was not lit and did not have a railing.55  
Additionally, evidence was presented at trial that the linoleum covering the tread of 
each stair “was badly worn and contained holes of such a nature as to create a 
hazard.”56  At approximately 8:30 p.m., the plaintiff decided to leave and used a 
match to light the stairway.57  She took a single step, tripped, and fell to the bottom 
of the stairs, suffering severe injuries.58  The defendant argued that if the plaintiff, 
who could see what she was doing, could not explain exactly what caused her to 
fall, the jury could not possibly determine that fact without engaging in speculation 
or guessing.59  However, the Law Court declined to invalidate the fact-finder’s 
right to make that determination,60 and held that the jury could have reasonably 
inferred, based on the evidence presented, that the plaintiff “stumbled or tripped 
over the defective covering and because of the defects” of the stairs.61 
                                                                                                     
 47. See id. at 381-83, 71 A. at 1023-24. 
 48. Id. at 389, 71 A. at 1026. 
 49. Id. at 384, 71 A. at 1025. 
 50. Lebrecque, 104 Me. at 390, 71 A. at 1027.  
 51. Id. at 389, 71 A. at 1026. 
 52. Thompson II, 151 Me. 54, 115 A.2d 718 (1955). 
 53. Id. at 55, 115 A.2d at 718.  This appeal included two cases, reviewed together, in which Anna 
Thompson and her husband sought damages for her injuries.  Id.  The plaintiffs had obtained a verdict in 
a previous trial, but the Law Court granted a new trial on the defendant’s motion because the jury had 
not been instructed on the issue of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.  Id., 115 A.2d at 718; see 
Thompson v. Franckus (Thompson I), 150 Me. 196, 204, 107 A.2d 485, 489 (1954).  In Thompson II, 
the facts did not materially differ, and the Law Court reviewed them as fully stated in its first opinion.  
Thompson II, 151 Me. at 55, 115 A.2d at 718.  
 54. Thompson I, 150 Me. at 197, 107 A.2d at 486.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 198, 107 A.2d at 486. 
 57. Id. at 197-98, 107 A.2d at 486. 
 58. Id. at 198, 107 A.2d at 486. 
 59. Thompson II, 151 Me. at 58, 115 A.2d at 720. 
 60. See id. at 60, 115 A.2d at 721 (stating that “it was for the jury to determine whether or not the 
defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s fall”).  
 61. Id. at 59, 115 A.2d at 720. 
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More recently, in Rodrigue v. Rodrigue,62 the Law Court vacated a summary 
judgment granted in favor of the defendant in part because it determined that 
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the defendant’s negligence 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.63  In that case, the plaintiff and 
her adult son were renting a first-floor apartment in a building owned by the 
defendant.64  Heat was provided by a furnace located in the dirt floor basement, 
which could be accessed through the plaintiff’s apartment.65  According to the 
plaintiff, she had been down the stairs to the basement only once, years before the 
accident in question, and the basement was only used to store a Christmas tree and 
some ornaments, and “the stairs were covered with plaster, dust, and debris, such as 
boards, nails, paint cans, and brushes.”66   
On the morning of the accident, the plaintiff awoke to a cold apartment and 
decided to go downstairs to check the furnace.67  She slipped on the second or third 
step, even though she did not know exactly what she slipped on, and fell to the 
bottom of the stairs, suffering back, neck, head, and shoulder injuries.68  The Law 
Court cited Thompson II for support that a reasonable inference of proximate cause 
may be sufficient, and held that the summary judgment should be vacated because 
the plaintiff’s testimony, if believed, could support a finding that her injuries were 
proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence in maintaining the stairs.69   
The Law Court applied the analysis of reasonable inference of proximate cause 
again in Marcoux v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division.70  The plaintiff in 
that case was a full-time employee of a staffing agency that provided the 
defendant’s plant with temporary workers.71  The plaintiff’s responsibilities 
included making rounds with the plant supervisors and verifying the workers’ 
hours.72  While walking around the plant, the plaintiff came across a green liquid 
stain on the floor to her right, and a bucket with no mops in it to her left.73  The 
plaintiff walked between the stain and the bucket in order to avoid them, but lost 
her footing and fell.74  Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
the Law Court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to proximate 
cause because there was evidence in the record that could support a finding that 
there was a stain on the floor right before and after the plaintiff fell.75  
F.  Maine’s Precedent: Reasonable Inference of Proximate Cause Not Found 
In another line of cases, the Law Court has declined to find a reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 62. 1997 ME 99, 694 A.2d 924. 
 63. See id. ¶ 16, 694 A.2d at 927. 
 64. Id. ¶ 2, 694 A.2d at 925.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. ¶¶ 3-6, 694 A.2d at 925. 
 67. Id. ¶ 2, 694 A.2d at 925. 
 68. Rodrigue, 1997 ME 99, ¶¶ 2, 6, 694 A.2d at 925. 
 69. Id. ¶¶ 14-16, 694 A.2d at 927. 
 70. 2005 ME 107, 881 A.2d 1138.  
 71. Id. ¶ 2, 881 A.2d at 1140.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. ¶ 3, 881 A.2d at 1140. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 881 A.2d at 1146. 
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inference of proximate cause.  For example, in Cyr v. Adamar Associates Ltd. 
Partnership,76 the personal representative of the estate of a motel patron appealed 
the grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.77  The 
patron was a registered guest in a motel owned by the defendant and was 
socializing with her co-workers at the motel lounge when she noticed that a man 
was staring at her.78  She got up to go to the ladies’ room and stated that she would 
return shortly.79  She never returned, and her dead body was found the next day in a 
nearby field that was not owned by the defendant.80  Her injuries showed signs of a 
struggle.81  The Law Court determined that the defendant was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law based on the lack of evidence as to whether the patron was 
abducted or whether she voluntarily left with the person who later killed her, and, 
coupled with the fact that her body was found on a property not owned by the 
defendant, the connection between the motel’s security measures and the patron’s 
death was too tenuous and uncertain to hold the defendant liable.82 
Lack of evidence of causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and 
the plaintiff’s injuries similarly led to the affirmance of summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant in Houde v. Millett.83  There, the plaintiff was a friend of the 
tenant of a first-floor apartment in a building owned by the defendant, and stayed 
there in order to take care of her friend’s son while the tenant was away.84  The 
tenant had access to and used the building’s basement.85  A few months before the 
accident in question, the defendant had hired a company to line the chimney.86  The 
workers left a large amount of soot on the basement floor and, despite numerous 
requests from the plaintiff, the defendant never cleaned the basement.87  The night 
before the accident, the tenant’s son had tracked an unusually large amount of soot 
onto the kitchen floor, and the plaintiff cleaned it up.88  The next morning, the 
plaintiff was sitting down in the kitchen; she then got up, took two steps, and 
slipped, at which point her leg got caught in the chair and was broken in several 
places.89   
Although the plaintiff did not see, nor did anyone else observe, any soot on the 
floor that morning, she noticed a smudge that looked like a soot stain on her 
pajamas after the accident, and she could not think of any other way soot could 
have appeared on her pajamas.90  The Law Court noted that the evidence made it 
“possible” that soot on the floor was the cause of the accident, but that, based on 
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the evidence, the jury would have to engage in speculation as to the condition of 
the floor that morning; therefore, the Law Court held that the defendant was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.91 
A few years later, the Law Court was again asked to review a summary 
judgment ruling in favor of a defendant.  In Durham v. HTH Corp.,92 the plaintiff 
was a patron in a restaurant operated by the defendant.93  The bathrooms of the 
establishment were located downstairs from the dining area, and the plaintiff had 
gone down those stairs on previous occasions, including the night of the accident 
that initiated the case.94  Later that night, the plaintiff again headed down the stairs, 
but her heel got caught on something on the first step, and she fell and hit her head 
on the wall.95  There were no witnesses to the fall.96  There was evidence in the 
record that the area was not well lit and that the metal strip placed on the step had 
been replaced three years before the accident, but was dirty and had never been 
cleaned before.97  The record also contained references to two prior accidents on 
the stairs involving other patrons; however, it did not include any additional 
information as to the circumstances of those accidents.98  Additionally, evidence 
was presented that a few hours after the accident the metal strip was pulled up; 
however, there was no evidence as to the metal strip’s condition prior to the 
accident.99  Based on the lack of evidence of a dangerous condition associated with 
the metal strip before the accident occurred, the Law Court concluded that 
causation could not be proved.100   
It was this line of cases that the Kennebec County Superior Court relied upon 
in Addy in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
proximate cause.   
III.  THE ADDY DECISION 
A.  The Trial Court’s Order 
The plaintiff in Addy filed a complaint in the Kennebec County Superior 
Court, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant’s negligence proximately caused 
injuries to him.101  After the discovery process, the defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment, maintaining that the plaintiff could not establish whether he 
fell off the staging, that this was merely an assumption on his part based on where 
he landed, and that the plaintiff had admitted in his deposition that he could have 
fallen off the roof of the adjacent building or off a ladder used to access that roof.102  
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Therefore, the defendant argued, the evidence was too speculative to support a 
finding of proximate cause.103  The plaintiff responded that even though he did not 
remember exactly how he fell, he did recall climbing down the staging, and that it 
was more probable than not that the defective condition of the staging was a 
substantial cause of his injuries.104 
The trial court found that upon completing his project on the day of the 
accident, the plaintiff had stepped from the edge of the roof onto the staging, but 
remembered nothing that transpired until he found himself on the ground injured.105  
The trial court relied on the Law Court’s precedent regarding reasonable inference 
of proximate cause because no direct evidence was presented as to the plaintiff’s 
fall, and, considering all the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
concluded that there was no evidence that the defendant’s negligence was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.106 
B.  The Majority’s Opinion 
On appeal to the Law Court, the parties renewed their causation arguments and 
engaged in vigorous evidentiary and factual disputes.107  Nonetheless, the majority 
acknowledged that “[a]lthough [the plaintiff’s] evidence is somewhat 
contradictory, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, there [was] evidence 
that his fall was from the staging erected by [the defendant].”108  The majority 
further stated, however, that the plaintiff did not remember exactly how he fell, and 
whether his fall had anything to do with the deficiencies of the staging, which were 
the very facts the plaintiff relied upon to establish causation.109  
The majority reviewed the rules applicable to proximate causation at the 
summary judgment stage, and examined Durham in detail as an analogous case.110  
The majority concluded that, just like the plaintiff in Durham, the plaintiff in this 
case had failed to establish a connection between the defendant’s negligence and 
the injuries suffered because the plaintiff had “presented evidence of only from 
where he fell, rather than how he fell.”111  The Law Court further distinguished 
Thompson II because in that case the plaintiff had offered more evidence on 
causation than the plaintiff had presented in this case—the plaintiff in Thompson II 
“attempted to descend the stairs of an apartment building, . . . the stairs were in a 
dilapidated condition, . . . she ‘reached for a hand rail and found that there was 
none,’ and . . . she tripped and fell as she was descending the stairs.”112  
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Accordingly, in Addy, the Law Court held that the superior court was correct in 
granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that any 
finding that the plaintiff’s fall was caused by defects in the staging would have 
been based on conjecture or speculation.113 
C.  The Dissent 
Justice Silver, joined by Justice Levy, labeled the majority’s opinion “a 
significant departure from our prior case law” and stated that the majority now 
required that “a plaintiff must present direct evidence of proximate cause in order 
to withstand summary judgment, and that reasonable inferences [were] no longer 
permissible.”114  Justice Silver further stated that the majority disregarded the well-
established and methodical analysis previously applied by the Law Court in 
distinguishing reasonable inferences from speculation,115 and simply chose not to 
discuss in any way the role of inference in this case.116  The dissent then went on to 
contend that it was perfectly reasonable to infer causation here “given that (1) the 
lack of safety equipment on the staging [was] undisputed; (2) Addy fell while 
descending the staging; and (3) no competing inference [had] been advanced by 
[the defendant].”117   
Justice Silver distinguished Durham and Houde, which were relied upon by 
the majority, by reasoning that there was no significant evidence of the existence of 
a dangerous condition before the accidents in either of those cases.118  The dissent 
offered comparison to a more applicable case, Marcoux, where there was evidence 
of a dangerous condition, but the plaintiff did not remember exactly how she fell.119  
Justice Silver pointed out that the facts in Marcoux, where the plaintiff had been 
allowed to use a reasonable inference of causation in order to avoid summary 
judgment, were “legally indistinguishable” from the case at bar.120  Additionally, 
Justice Silver provided a side-by-side comparison of the facts in Thompson II with 
the ones in the case on appeal in order to demonstrate the lack of rational basis for 
distinguishing the two cases: 
In Thompson [II], the plaintiff attempted to descend the stairs of an apartment 
building.  Addy attempted to descend the staging.  In Thompson [II], the stairs 
were in a dilapidated condition, thus presenting a safety hazard.  Likewise, Addy 
was faced with a safety hazard upon his descent of the staging because it was not 
equipped with safety equipment.  In Thompson [II], the plaintiff tripped and fell as 
she was descending the stairs.  Addy fell as he was descending the staging.121  
Finally, the dissent expressed its concern that the majority’s opinion would 
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have unfortunate consequences for plaintiffs who had been injured as a result of 
known negligence on the part of the defendants, and that those plaintiffs would 
ironically be put at a greater disadvantage because of their lack of memory of the 
accident.122  While the plaintiff’s lack of memory may have presented a credibility 
issue in this case, Justice Silver argued that Addy was not an appropriate case for 
summary judgment.123  
IV.  ADDY HAS HEIGHTENED THE STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHING A REASONABLE 
INFERENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE IN MAINE 
The doctrine of reasonable inference of proximate cause was firmly 
established in Maine more than a century ago.  It has been applied by the Law 
Court consistently until 2009, when the majority in Addy chose to alter it.  It must 
be noted that Justice Silver rather unconvincingly critiqued certain aspects of the 
majority’s opinion—for example, that the majority suggested “a plaintiff must 
present direct evidence of proximate cause in order to withstand summary 
judgment, and . . . reasonable inferences are no longer permissible,” and that “a 
plaintiff who cannot remember an otherwise unwitnessed accident cannot rely on 
any inference, however reasonable . . . .”124  To the contrary, the majority searched 
for a reasonable inference of proximate cause between the defendant’s breach of 
duty and the plaintiff’s injury, but did not find it based on the facts of this particular 
case.   
Nonetheless, the Law Court’s decision represents a significant modification of 
the established contours of the doctrine considering the essential differences 
between the facts of this case and some of the earlier cases cited by the majority as 
support for the conclusion that the plaintiff was unsuccessful in showing proximate 
cause and that judgment as a matter of law for the defendant was proper.  Houde 
and Durham, both used by the majority as analogous cases, have one element in 
common—no evidence was presented by the plaintiffs that a dangerous condition 
existed before the accidents happened.125  In those cases, the Law Court held, as a 
matter of law, that proximate cause could not be proven precisely because of the 
lack of that crucial evidence.126  In stark contrast, in Addy, the facts viewed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff showed that he was in direct contact with the 
staging, which was found by the majority to be defective and dangerous, just prior 
to the accident.127   
Under the majority’s analysis, the opinion may have reached a different 
conclusion had the court determined that the plaintiff had not been on the staging 
when he fell.  In that situation, the plaintiff would have been in the same position as 
the plaintiffs in Houde and Durham—the fact that the defendant was negligent in 
some way could not have been proximately linked to the plaintiff’s injuries.  
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However, the majority expressly stated that it accepted, for the purpose of summary 
judgment review, the plaintiff’s testimony that he fell while descending the 
staging.128   
In refusing to disturb the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, the majority relied on the distinction between the plaintiff’s 
evidence as to from where he fell and how he fell.129  However, this is where the 
doctrine of reasonable inferences of proximate cause is implicated—it has been 
firmly and consistently established by the Law Court that the lack of direct 
evidence can be substituted with permissible inferences if they flow logically from 
the rest of the evidence, and that even if there are multiple explanations for a given 
event, the higher probability of one over the other is sufficient to overcome a 
dispositive motion.130  Moreover, as Justice Silver pointed out, the defendant in 
Addy did not offer any competing inference.131  Accordingly, a highly probable and 
reasonable inference based on the facts of the case was that the defective and 
dangerous condition of the staging, created by the defendant, was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.  Therefore, the doctrine of reasonable inference of 
proximate cause was applicable, and genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
causation.   
A comparison of the facts in Addy with the previous decisions of the Law 
Court, in which a reasonable inference of proximate cause was found, makes the 
outcome of Addy even more puzzling.  In all of those cases, the plaintiff had no 
recollection or could not explain exactly how the accident happened, and no one 
witnessed it.132  In each case, however, there was evidence that the dangerous 
condition, created by the defendants, was present immediately prior to the 
accident.133  As a result, the Law Court held in each instance that genuine issues of 
material fact existed that needed to be determined by a jury.134  Despite the 
indistinguishable facts in Addy—the plaintiff could not remember exactly how he 
fell, there were no witnesses to his fall, and just prior to the accident he was in 
contact with the defectively constructed staging—the majority in this case decided 
that causation was lacking as a matter of law. 
A recent application of Addy illustrates the consequences of its holding.  In a 
2009 Cumberland County Superior Court order on a motion for summary 
judgment, the facts presented were as follows: A real estate broker was showing a 
mobile home to the plaintiff, a potential buyer.135  While inspecting part of the 
property by herself, the plaintiff came to a door, opened it without knowing what 
was on the other side, stepped in, and fell to the bottom of a set of stairs, sustaining 
serious injuries.136  As it turned out, the door opened into a stairway leading to the 
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mobile home’s basement.137  At her deposition, the plaintiff testified that at the 
time of the accident, she “got one foot in and . . . went airborne.”138  The plaintiff 
alleged in her summary judgment pleadings that the mobile home was not well lit, 
that the real estate broker did not warn the plaintiff that the home had a basement, 
which was a rarity for mobile homes, and that the basement stairs were rickety and 
had no banister.139   
The superior court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
the defendants’ duties and breach.140  In reviewing causation, however, the trial 
court relied on Addy for the determination that, based on the plaintiff’s deposition 
testimony, the defendants would be entitled to summary judgment to the extent that 
the plaintiff was “premising liability on the allegedly rickety condition of the stairs 
or on alleged code violations that could be linked to [the plaintiff’s] fall only by 
speculation.”141  However, the court went on to determine that genuine issues of 
material fact existed as to whether the specific appearance of the basement door 
and stairs were not sufficiently obvious so that a warning would be required.142  
Therefore, even though the plaintiff prevailed on other grounds, the court would 
have declined to apply the doctrine of reasonable inference of causation, even 
though genuine issues of material fact existed as to the defective condition of the 
stairs, and the plaintiff was allegedly in contact with them. 
The Law Court’s modification of the doctrine of reasonable inference of 
proximate cause could have been prompted by the recent trend of liberal use of 
summary judgment practice.143  During the 1980s and 1990s, courts began granting 
summary judgment in cases that had a very limited chance of success, even though 
some disputes as to material facts existed.144  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit views summary judgment as a device that “has proven its 
usefulness as a means of avoiding full-dress trials in unwinnable cases, thereby 
freeing courts to utilize scarce judicial resources in more beneficial ways.”145  
Consequently, crammed dockets and scheduling difficulties have led to more grants 
of summary judgment motions in marginal cases, and the affirmation of these 
rulings on appeal.146 
Whatever the reason, however, by amending the doctrine of reasonable 
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inference of proximate cause, the majority in Addy created a dangerous precedent 
that will likely disfavor plaintiffs with a lack of memory of the circumstances of an 
accident.  The doctrine has been part of the law in Maine for significant reasons—
among others, eliminating the doctrine would “invite perjury on the part of 
plaintiffs who in all honesty do not know or cannot recall exactly what did 
happen.”147  After all, the existence or lack of proximate cause is to be determined 
by the jury unless the evidence is insufficient “as a matter of law.”148  Therefore, 
unless there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the probability that the 
defendant’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, courts should 
defer to the jurors’ wisdom and ability to uncover the truth.  Unfortunately, after 
Addy, this could possibly be the case less and less for plaintiffs with little or no 
recollection of the events and unable to present direct evidence of how an accident 
occurred.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note contends that the facts in Addy warranted a finding of a reasonable 
inference of proximate cause based on the Law Court’s precedent on that issue, at 
least for the purposes of overcoming summary judgment.  They presented genuine 
issues of material fact that should have been decided by a jury.  Additionally, from 
a broader standpoint, this case has heightened the standard for showing a 
reasonable inference of proximate cause at the dispositive motion stages of the 
litigation of negligence claims in Maine.  
A review of Maine’s proximate causation precedent reveals that over the last 
decade this legal concept has been frequently used to decide cases “as a matter of 
law” on summary judgment or post-verdict motions.  Accelerating this trend, the 
majority in Addy distinguished prior decisions of the Law Court, in which a 
reasonable inference of proximate cause had been found on very similar facts for 
the purpose of overcoming dispositive motions.  The Law Court’s decision in Addy 
has left the dissenters, as well as other critics,149 concerned that plaintiffs with no 
recollection of the circumstances of an accident and who cannot produce direct 
evidence will not be able to get past summary judgment.  Moreover, even if those 
plaintiffs survive summary judgment and are successful in obtaining jury verdicts, 
the judgments based on those verdicts may later be vacated by the courts by 
granting motions for judgment as a matter of law based on claims of insufficiency 
of the evidence to support those verdicts. 
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